Cooperation in indefinite games: Evidence from red queen games

Andrew Smyth, Cortney S. Rodet

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We test whether the length of an indefinite horizon, or that the horizon is indefinite as opposed to finite, affects cooperation in repeated 3×3 Red Queen Games. With our participant population, and our experimental program and procedures, the length of the indefinite horizon significantly affects cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. It also significantly affects cooperation in the Red Queen Game, but only after participants are experienced. The indefiniteness of the horizon does not significantly affect cooperation in either game. Our results highlight the importance of experience for cooperation in indefinite games with even slightly larger strategy spaces than the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)230-257
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume208
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2023

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Experimental economics
  • Learning
  • Prisoner's Dilemma
  • Red Queen Game
  • Repeated games
  • Prisoner’s Dilemma

EGS Disciplines

  • Economics

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