From Relative Truth to Finean Non-Factualism

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Abstract

This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis; its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non- factualism is the better relativist theory. As I explain, non-facualism about deliciousness is happily combined with an invariantist semantics for the word “delicious”. On this approach, relativism is a matter for a metaphysical theory, not a linguistic one.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)971-989
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations
Volume193
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2016

Keywords

  • Kit Fine
  • matters of taste
  • non-factualism
  • relative truth

EGS Disciplines

  • Philosophy

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