Abstract
This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally.
Original language | American English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 157-174 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Episteme |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 2019 |
EGS Disciplines
- Philosophy