Lobbying from Inside the System: Why Local Governments Pay for Representation in the U.S. Congress

Matt W. Loftis, Jaclyn J. Kettler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations
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Abstract

Why do cities spend scarce resources lobbying the federal government? The hierarchy of U.S. government provides various pathways for local representation. Nevertheless, cities regularly invest in paid representation. This presents a puzzle for American democracy. Why do cities lobby, and do they lobby strategically? We quantify for the first time the extent of this phenomenon and examine its determinants using new data on 498 cities across forty-five states from 1998 to 2008. We find that economic distress pushes cities to lobby, but does not impact expenditures. Cities in competitive congressional districts, and therefore crucial to national politics, spend more on lobbying.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)193-206
Number of pages14
JournalSAGE
Volume68
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2015

Keywords

  • Congress
  • government lobbying
  • interest groups
  • local government

EGS Disciplines

  • Political Science

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