Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Brian Kierland

doi:10.2478/disp-2011-0010

Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Brian Kierland

Philosophy Department

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., 'Nothing is both red and green all over' – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	235-237
Number of pages	3
Journal	Disputatio
Volume	4
Issue number	31
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0010
State	Published - Nov 2011

Keywords

Analyticity
Color
Color incompatibility
Necessity

EGS Disciplines

Philosophy

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10.2478/disp-2011-0010License: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "Necessity and Color Incompatibility",

abstract = " A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., 'Nothing is both red and green all over' – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.",

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N2 - A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., 'Nothing is both red and green all over' – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.

AB - A traditional view is that all necessary truths are analytic. A frequent objection is that certain claims of color incompatibility – e.g., 'Nothing is both red and green all over' – are necessarily true but not analytic. I argue that this objection to the traditional view fails because such color incompatibility claims are either analytic or contingent.

KW - Analyticity

KW - Color

KW - Color incompatibility

KW - Necessity

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84861484624

UR - https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/philosophy_facpubs/15

U2 - 10.2478/disp-2011-0010

DO - 10.2478/disp-2011-0010

M3 - Review article

SN - 0873-626X

VL - 4

SP - 235

EP - 237

JO - Disputatio

JF - Disputatio

IS - 31

ER -

Necessity and Color Incompatibility

Abstract

Keywords

EGS Disciplines

Access to Document

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Cite this