Abstract
In this paper, we show that presentismthe view that the way things are is the way things presently areis not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 485-497 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 2007 |
EGS Disciplines
- Epistemology
- Ethics and Political Philosophy
- Metaphysics
- Philosophy