Side-channel Leakage Assessment Metrics: A Case Study of GIFT Block Ciphers

William Unger, Liljana Babinkostova, Mike Borowczak, Robert Erbes

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Determination of an adequate level of security and providing subsequent mechanisms to achieve it, is one of the most pressing problems regarding embedded computing devices. While there are some solutions available for resource-rich computer systems, direct application of these solutions to resource-constrained environments are often unfeasible. The fundamental problem for such resource-constrained systems is the fact that current cryptographic algorithms utilize significant energy consumption and storage overhead. Both the cryptographic algorithm and its physical implementation affect the resilience of a cryptosystem against side-channel attacks. A side-channel attack represents a process that exploits leakages in order to extract sensitive information such as the key. This paper focuses on Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) which is side-channel attack based on the power consumption leakage. In 2016 the U.S. Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated the call for proposals of new cryptographic algorithms to strengthen the cryptographic defense of networked devices against cyberattacks and to protect the data created by those innumerable device. This work evaluates S-boxes used by NIST candidates PICCOLO, GIFT, and PRESENT, as well as several S-box variants that demonstrated sufficient weaknesses against classical cryptanalysis, for a quantitative comparison in terms of resiliency to CPA attack. Three well-known theoretical metrics are evaluated: transparency order (TO and RTO), non-linearity, and signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio, aiming to characterize the resistance of these S-boxes against adversaries exploiting physical leakages. Experimental results from attacks on an 8-bit XMEGA were obtained via the ChipWhisperer platform and of all the S-boxes evaluated, GIFT64 with a PICCOLO S-box was found to be the most susceptible to CPA. Results showed that variations in TO and RTO were not sufficient to ensure practical CPA resistance and that among S-boxes with equal non-linearity there were no significant differences in the TO and SNR variants.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2021 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2021
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages236-241
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781665439466
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2021
Event20th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2021 - Tampa, United States
Duration: 7 Jul 20219 Jul 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings of IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI
Volume2021-July
ISSN (Print)2159-3469
ISSN (Electronic)2159-3477

Conference

Conference20th IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2021
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityTampa
Period7/07/219/07/21

Keywords

  • Correlation Power Analysis
  • Non-linearity
  • Signal-to-Noise Ratio
  • Transparency Order

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