The Metaphor of Natural Kinds: Recognizing Scientific Pluralism

Philosophers of science have long discussed natural kinds, or those objects in the world that are objectively distinct from each other and exist independently of observation. Although contemporary discussions have troubled this conception, they often demand conceptions of science that set narrow standards for truth which, in turn, discounts other knowledge systems. It is thus critical that we develop an account of natural kinds that recognizes the plurality of knowledge, scientific or otherwise. This paper argues that what we take natural kinds to be are metaphors, in the literal sense, that are intelligible only within a conceptual architecture that is developed from our embodied and social experiences. Natural-kinds-as-metaphors demands that we take seriously the embodied socio-cultural constituents of the concepts we use to structure our inquiries, allowing a more diverse picture of scientific knowledge to emerge by recognizing the imperfection of the concepts we take to be “natural”.